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Introduction
Since September 11, 2001, Congress has toughened U.S. immigration
policy in an effort to combat the perceived terrorist threat posed by nonci-
tizens on U.S. soil.1 While Congress has passed immigration legislation
specifically targeting terrorists and suspected terrorists, 2 and immigration
authorities have dutifully enforced this legislation,3 civil libertarians have
decried the effects of these measures on Arab and Muslim American com-
munities and on detained persons of Arab or Muslim descent.4 While Arab
and Muslim communities have reason to protest, a recent precedential rul-
ing of Attorney General John Ashcroft, In re D-J-,5 demonstrates that the
government has cast its net in its fight against terrorism well beyond these
communities.6
The target population of the post-September 11th immigration-related
security measures involved in D-J- is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a historically
disfavored immigrant group: undocumented Haitians arriving by sea,
many of whom claim asylum. 7 Citing "national security" considerations,
1. See Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, As the World Turns: Immigration Law
Before and After September 11, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 22, 2001, at 3.
2. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) § 236A, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(1952), amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-
56, Title IV, § 412(a), 115 Stat. 350 (2001) (allowing, among other provisions, the gov-
ernment to detain noncitizens suspected of terrorism for up to seven days before any
charges are filed, and indefinitely thereafter); see also I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B) (1952) (pertaining to exclusion of aliens based on terrorist activities).
3. See Demetrios Papademetriou et al., America's Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil
Liberties, and National Unity After September 11, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1193, 1194
(2003).
4. See, e.g., Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Migration Regulation Goes Local:
The Role of the States in U.S. Immigration Policy: Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law
After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. AM.
L. 295 (2002) (discussing the impact of September 11 th on immigration and civil rights
of Arab and Muslim noncitizens, and related effects on Arab and Muslim Americans).
5. See In re D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 572, 581 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
6. See David B. Pakula & Lawrence P. Lataif, EOIR, BICE, Others Testify on Post-9/
11 Adjudications, Closed Hearings, Special Registration, Civil Liberties, Other Issues, 80
INTERPRETER RELEASES 692, 693-94, 696 (2003).
7. See generally Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (stating that Article 33 of the
United Nations Protocol Convention relating to the status of refugees did not apply to
Haitians apprehended before they had landed on U.S. soil, because the Protocol was "not
intended to govern parties' conduct outside their borders"); Haitian Refugee Center v.
Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (determining that the Haitian Refugee Center
lacked standing to challenge the U.S. government's program of interdicting on the high
seas undocumented Haitians trying to reach the United States); Pierre v. United States,
547 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the United Nations Protocol did not grant
aliens due process rights under the U.S. Constitution and the distinction between
excludable aliens and aliens who have made entry does not deny excludable aliens-
here, Haitians apprehended on open waters-equal protection). See also Donald Kerwin,
Counterterrorism and Immigrant Rights Two Years Later, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1401,
1403 (2003) ("Haitian boat people, long the object of disparate treatment by the U.S.,
have also been miscast as a security threat."); Wendy Young, Director of Government
Relations, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Presentation to Church
World Service Conference on Haitian Refugees (Feb. 5, 2003), at http://
www.worrenscommission.org/archive/03/statements/haiti.html (last visited Nov. 22,
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the Attorney General ("AG") determined in D-J- that release on bond of a
Haitian asylum seeker, David Joseph, and similarly situated persons was
unwarranted. 8
This paper explores the path the AG took to classify Haitian asylum
seekers as a threat to national security and the resultant detention without
bond for such persons awaiting a decision on removal. In challenging the
AG's decision in D-J-, I dissect the two-step combination that led to the
AG's unilateral, unchecked decision to deprive noncriminal, undocu-
mented asylum seekers of their liberty while awaiting determination of
their immigration status. First, I address the Attorney General's complete
casting aside of the contrary determinations, of both fact and law, of the
Immigration Judge ("J") and of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
by asserting fully de novo review.9 Second, I explore the asserted nonre-
viewable nature of the Attorney General's decision by focusing on § 236(e)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and habeas corpus relief
for detained noncitizens. I conclude that the Attorney General's decision
to deprive noncriminal aliens of their freedom from government-imposed
restraint based on generalized national security concerns, rather than an
individualized determination, constitutes a deprivation of due process that
should be subject to judicial review in all cases.
Part I of this Note discusses pertinent background to the D-J- decision,
including the plenary power doctrine, use of a national security justifica-
tion in immigration matters historically, past U.S. treatment of Haitian asy-
lum seekers, and obligations to asylum seekers found under U.S. and
international law. Part II examines the Attorney General's decision in D-J-,
including his application of fully de novo review and exercise of broad dis-
cretion without judicial review, and his use of a national security justifica-
tion and its implication of the due process rights of inadmissible aliens.
Part II concludes with the AG's summary dismissal of applicable interna-
tional law. Part III analyzes flaws in the AG's opinion in D-J- by relying on
principles of administrative law and judicial review and by arguing that
plenary power is incompatible with due process. After demonstrating that
habeas corpus remains available to inadmissible persons such as David
Joseph, Part III argues that the AG decided D-J- wrongly on the merits, in
that his decision both lacks a "reasonable foundation" and is contrary to
principles of statutory construction. Part III also covers the AG's problem-
2004) [hereinafter Young, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
Presentation]
Clearly, the message the U.S. government wishes to send is 'Haitians not wel-
come.' ... But first I should say that a desire to keep Haitians out.., is nothing
new. Those who lived through the Haitian crisis of the early to mid 90s are only
too familiar with the dynamics .... Finally, reflecting the times in which we find
ourselves, the U.S. government has come up with a new argument to support the
restrictions it has applied to Haitians. It has characterized Haitians as a threat to
our national security.
Id; D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 580 (noting "[t]he persistent history of mass migration from
Haiti, in the face of concerted statutory and regulatory measures to curtail it").
8. D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 574.
9. Id. at 575.
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atic dismissal of relevant international law. Finally, this Note concludes
that the AG's decision in D-J represents an unreasonable exercise of
unchecked power-using "national security" as a pretext to deter an unde-
sirable immigrant group-that should be subject to judicial review in all
cases.
I. Background
A. Plenary Power & Exclusion
Since the Chinese Exclusion Case'0 of 1889, a "plenary power doctrine"
has developed that gives the political branches "sole and full authority over
the legal regime governing immigration" and extraordinary judicial defer-
ence to their actions in the area." Congress's plenary power to exclude
and to admit aliens found its bases in sovereignty itself and other "inci-
dents" of sovereignty, including the federal power to conduct foreign rela-
tions and the war power. 12
The traditional distinction between the power to deport and the power
to exclude has coincided with the measure of constitutional protection the
Court has granted these classes of persons: "Deportable" persons, i.e.,
those lawfully admitted to the United States and later ordered removed,
have been afforded a greater degree of rights than "excludable" persons,
i.e., those not lawfully admitted although sometimes present in the United
States nonetheless. 13 In 1996, Congress collapsed the longstanding dis-
tinction between deportable and excludable or inadmissible aliens into a
single category of removable persons. 14 However, in a recent decision, the
Court noted the continuing importance of the distinction. 15
10. Chae Chan Ping v. United States [the Chinese Exclusion Case], 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
11. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 9.03 (2003); see
also Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603 ("That the government of the United
States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its terri-
tory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy.").
12. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 9.03.
13. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545,
550-60 (1990). Noncitizens present in the United States who have not been lawfully
admitted are termed "inadmissible" (formerly "excludable") and are subject to removal
under the Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1952). Nonci-
tizens who have been lawfully admitted may be subject to removal (on various grounds)
through deportation. Id. § 237. The 1996 legislation also replaced the term "entry,"
which covered both legal and illegal passage into the country, with the concept of
"admission," i.e., inspection and authorized entry by an immigration official. See
Motomura, supra at 557; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA) § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (1996). The 1996 changes tried to do away
with the so-called "entry fiction." Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immi-
gration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 631 n.98 (2003). Under
the "entry fiction," inadmissible noncitizens present in the United States were deemed
stopped at the border for constitutional purposes. Id. This justified giving inadmissible
or excludable noncitizens fewer constitutional rights than deportable noncitizens. Id.
14. See IIRIRA § 304(a); Miller, supra note 13, at 631 n.98.
15. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
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Shortly after the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court used the plenary
power doctrine to immunize executive officers from judicial review of their
discretionary decisions over excludable immigrants.16 In that case, the
Court held that where Congress had expressly entrusted the final determi-
nation of facts to an executive officer, the officer's statutorily conferred
discretionary power was
to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is made the
sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribu-
nal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or
controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. 1
7
In 1950, the Court reaffirmed the plenary power of the political
branches to determine the procedures due to excludable noncitizens:
"Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far
as an alien denied entry is concerned." 18
B. National Security Justification Historically
Historically the government has used its exclusion power to bar the
entry of classes of persons it deemed a threat to security. 19 The classifica-
tion of inadmissible persons has coincided with perceived threats to U.S.
security based on domestic and global developments. 20 In the early part of
the twentieth century, with apprehension about the possible spread of Bol-
shevism at the close of World War I, Congress enacted the Anarchist Act of
191821 to exclude and deport aliens based on affiliation or membership in
organizations advocating the forcible overthrow of the U.S. government. 2 2
With the U.S. entrance into World War II on the horizon, Congress enacted
16. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (affirming, however,
the right of detained noncitizens to seek habeas corpus: "An alien immigrant, prevented
from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an act of Congress,
and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to
ascertain whether the restraint is lawful"). Excludable refers to "foreigners who have
never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States,
nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law." Id. Petitioner, a Japanese
national, was intercepted and detained when the steamship she was traveling on arrived
at the port of San Francisco. Id.
17. Id.
18. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
In the particular circumstances of the instant case the Attorney General, exercis-
ing the discretion entrusted to him by Congress and the President, concluded
upon the basis of confidential information that the public interest required that
petitioner [the German wife of a naturalized citizen] be denied the privilege of
entry into the United States. He denied her a hearing on the matter because, in
his judgment, the disclosure of the information on which he based that opinion
would itself endanger the public security.
Id.
19. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 63.04[2].
20. See id.
21. Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012, amended by 8 U.S.C.
§ 137 (1925-26) (repealed 1952).
22. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 71.06.
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the Alien Registration Act of 194023 to deal with Communists and mem-
bers of other subversive groups. 24 In the Cold War period, Congress
enacted the 1950 Internal Security Act25 that banned the entrance of cur-
rent or past members of the Communist Party. 26 Congress responded to
the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by signifi-
cantly easing restrictions on the admissibility of members or affiliates of
the Communist Party.2 7 In the 1990s, Congress shifted its focus from
Communists to terrorists, against whom analogous exclusion measures
have been directed. 2 8
Currently the Immigration and Nationality Act's security related
grounds for exclusion apply to any alien who seeks to engage in or who has
engaged in any of the following activities: espionage, sabotage, violation of
certain export laws, "other unlawful activity," activities to overthrow the
government by force or unlawful means, terrorist activities or association
with terrorist organizations, activities having potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences, membership or affiliation with "the Commu-
nist or any other totalitarian party" (with exceptions), and Nazi persecu-
tion or genocide. 29
In the deportation context, the Court has deferred to Congress's
power to expel "aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful."
30
Historically, the Court has allowed Congress to expel even longtime U.S.
residents that it found undesirable, including Communists,3 1 convicted
23. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), amended by
ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206 (1948).
24. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 71.06.
25. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, Pub. L. No. 82-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1951)
(codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
26. See GoRDoN ET AL., supra note 11, § 63.04[2].
27. Id. § 63.0413][b][iii][C][iv][d].
28. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42,
50 U.S.C.); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001). See also GomoN ET AL., supra note 11, §63.04[2]:
Increased terrorism in the United States in the mid-1990[s], some allegedly con-
ducted by noncitizens, prompted Congress to enact measures to make terrorists
more easily inadmissible and removable. As one congressional report noted at
the time, "[tihe removal of alien terrorists from the U.S., and the prevention of
alien terrorists from entering the U.S. in the first place, present among the most
intractable problems of immigration enforcement."
Id.
29. See I.N.A. § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3).
30. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 536 & n.25 (1952) (citing cases in which
"[Congress] was, in the exercise of its unquestioned right, only seeking to rid the coun-
try of persons who had shown by their career that their continued presence here would
not make for the safety or welfare of society").
31. See, e.g., Carlson, 342 U.S. at 524 (holding that Congress has the power to expel
a Communist from the United States); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)
(upholding Congress's right to expel former Communists who were longtime U.S.
residents).
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criminals, 32 and aliens convicted of crimes against national security. 3 3
The Court has also noted that the Attorney General's authority to detain is
a necessary part of his power to deport.34 It has, however, understood the
Attorney General's authority to detain without bail as a necessary power to
be used in order to avoid giving aliens the opportunity "to hurt the United
States during the pendency of deportation proceedings. '3 5 The Court has
expressly stated that "[ojf course purpose to injure could not be imputed
generally to all aliens subject to deportation, so discretion [to detain with-
out bail] was placed ... in the Attorney General .... 36
C. U.S. Treatment of Haitian Immigrants
Many commentators have recounted the extensive efforts of the U.S.
government to keep Haitians out of the United States. 3 7 The gravamen of
this story is that U.S. government policy towards Haitian asylum seekers
has been interminably restrictive and even cruel.
In 1981, the United States began a unique program of interdicting flee-
ing Haitians on the high seas and forcibly repatriating them after summary
shipboard screenings.3 8 In the early 1990s, before the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay became home to a new breed of U.S. enemy, the United
States interned on Guantanamo thousands of interdicted Haitians, many of
them HIV-positive, without due process of any kind.3 9 Then presidential
candidate Bill Clinton called this anti-Haitian policy of the first Bush
Administration "appalling" but then later endorsed it as his own once he
took office. 40
Haitians who made it past the Coast Guard to reach U.S. shores did
not fare much better. In 1981, with no new statutory or regulatory author-
ity, the Attorney General ordered detention without parole of arriving
immigrants who could not present a prima facie case for admission.4 1 In
Jean v. Nelson, a majority of the Court refused to rule on Haitian asylum
seekers' claim that the Immigration and Naturalization Service's ("INS")
32. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) (holding that Congress has the
power to expel a convicted criminal from the United States).
33. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950)
(holding that Congress has the power to expel from the United States aliens convicted of
crimes against national security).
34. See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 538.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The Haitian Centers Council Case: Reflections on
Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35 H~av. INT'L LJ. 1 (1994) (discussing the
efforts of the U.S. government to keep Haitians out of the United States); Carlos Ortiz
Miranda, Haiti and the United States During the 1980s and 1990s: Refugees, IMMIGRATION,
and Foreign Policy, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 673 (1995) (same); Maria Luisa Sepulveda,
Note, Barring Extraterritorial Protection for Haitian Refugees Interdicted on the High Seas:
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 44 CATH. U.L. REV. 321 (1994) (same).
38. Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy,
103 YALE LJ. 2391, 2392-93 (1994).
39. Id. at 2394-97.
40. Id. at 2396-97, 2397 n.29.
41. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849 (1985).
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detention regime under the AG's order violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fifth Amendment on race and national origin grounds.4 2
D. Obligations to Asylum Seekers Under U.S. and International Law
The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is
the primary source of international law governing states' obligations to
and treatment of asylum seekers. 4 3 Although the United States is not a
signatory to the Convention, it ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. 44 By ratifying the 1967 Protocol, the United States
bound itself to obligations contained in Articles 2 through 34 of the
Convention. 45
The Sixth Circuit has held that the Protocol is not self-executing and
therefore requires Congressional enactment to make its provisions judi-
cially enforceable in the United States. 4 6 The Second Circuit has similarly
held that because the treaty is not self-executing, all the protections that are
due to asylum seekers are contained exclusively in federal immigration
statutes. 4 7 Consequently, one could conclude that the provisions of the
Convention are irrelevant as a basis for asylum seekers to assert rights in
U.S. courts.
However, the Supreme Court has stated that Congress intended the
1980 Refugee Act to bring U.S. refugee law into conformance with the
1967 Protocol. 48 Moreover, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties4 9 supports the proposition that the United States does have obligations
to asylum seekers that are derived from international law.50 Article 26
(Pacta sunt servanda) of the Vienna Convention provides that "[e]very
42. Id. at 854-55.
43. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
44. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1968). Note that under U.S. law the term "refu-
gee" applies both to persons having a "well-founded fear of persecution" who are
processed through an overseas program and to persons who are at the U.S. border or
within the country who file a claim for asylum. 2 T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMI-
GRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 788-89 (5th ed. advanced copy 2003).
45. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 44, art. 1 ("The States
Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Con-
vention to refugees as hereinafter defined."); Abdelwahed v. I.N.S., 22 Fed. Appx. 811,
815 (9th Cir. 2001).
46. Castellano-Chacon v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 533, 544 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing I.N.S. v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984)).
47. Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982).
48. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 178 (1993); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987).
49. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
50. ThomasJ. Schoenbaum, Trade and Environment: Free International Trade and Pro-
tection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 700, 719 n.108
(1992) (explaining that "[b]ecause the Vienna Convention is regarded as declaratory of
existing law, it is considered authoritative even for countries [such as the United States]
not a party to it") (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES Pt. III (1987)).
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treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith.5 1 Article 27 further states that "[a] party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty." 5 2 Finally, the Supreme Court has held that "[a]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains."53
Under international standards, the right to liberty is a fundamental
human right as recognized by several universal and regional human rights
instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR"), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, and the American Convention on Human Rights ("Pact of
San Jose"), among others.5 4 All of these instruments specify that no per-
son should be arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty. 5 5 These protec-
tions apply to both refugees and asylum seekers. 56
11. The Attorney General's Decision in D-J-
A. The Holding
On April 17, 2003, the Attorney General issued a decision, constitut-
ing binding precedent 57 for Js and the BIA, that release on bond pending
determination of the asylum claim of a Haitian man or "similarly situated
undocumented seagoing migrants" was unwarranted due to "adverse con-
sequences for national security and sound immigration policy" that such
release from detention would trigger. 58
B. The Facts
In D-J-, a Haitian teenager 59 named David Joseph 60 arrived off the
coast of Florida in a crowded vessel carrying 216 undocumented persons
from Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 61 The U.S. Coast Guard sought to
interdict the vessel and then sought to apprehend the passengers after they
51. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 49, art. 26.
52. Id. at art. 27.
53. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
54. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Detention of Asy-
lum-Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the Problem and Recommended Practice, EC/
49/SC/CRP.13 (June 4, 1999) [hereinafter Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees].
55. Id.
56. Id. See also supra note 44 for an explanation of the difference between an over-
seas "refugee" and a person already at the border of or within a third country who claims
"asylum."
57. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 581 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
58. Id. at 579.
59. According to the American Immigration Lawyers Association's (AILA) Civil Lib-
erties Issue Packet, AILA Doc. No. 03061246, at http://www.aila.org/fileViewer.aspx?doc
ID=10527 (last visited Nov. 22, 2004), the respondent David Joseph in D-J- is 18 years
old.
60. Susan Benesch, Haitians Trapped by "War on Terrorism," AmNESTY Now, at http:/
/www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/haiti.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
61. D-J-, 23 I. & N. 576.
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reached U.S. soil.62 A group of arriving individuals tried to evade the
Coast Guard and other law enforcement officials after coming ashore,
although it was unclear whether David Joseph was among the persons try-
ing to evade apprehension. 63 David Joseph was placed in removal proceed-
ings as an inadmissible alien under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). 64 He claimed
asylum and was granted release on bond by the IJ pending determination
of his status. 65 The BIA dismissed the government's appeal of his release
on bond, "concluding ... that the broad national interests invoked by INS
were not appropriate considerations for the IJ or the BIA in making the
bond determination, '[a]bsent contrary direction from the Attorney
General."' 66
David Joseph testified before the IJ that he had not been arrested or
convicted of a crime, and that upon release on bond he would reside with
and be cared for by his uncle in New York City while his asylum claim was
pending.67 Despite these facts, the Attorney General was not persuaded
that David Joseph "did not present a danger to the community, a risk of
flight or a threat to national security."'68
C. Application of U.S. Law
1. De Novo Review of Fact and Law
The Attorney General asserted de novo review of the J's and BIA's
conclusions of both fact and law.69 While 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) pre-
cludes the BIA from de novo review of the J's fact finding,70 the AG con-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 576-77 ("1 find nothing in the record showing that respondent was not
among the alien migrants who disobeyed the orders of, and sought to evade, USCG or
law enforcement officers ashore in an effort to enter the United States unlawfully.").
64. Id. at 573. I.N.A. § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), reads: "An alien
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the
United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is
inadmissible."
65. D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 573.
66. Id. (citing the BIA's decision on March 13, 2003).
67. Id. at 577.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 575.
My review of the BIA's decision in this case is de novo; it is not confined to
reviewing the decisions of the BIA or the IJ for legal or factual error .... When I
undertake review of such decisions pursuant to a referral under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(h), the delegated authorities of the IJ and BIA are superseded and I am
authorized to make the determination based on my own conclusions on the
facts and the law.
Id.
70. See id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (specifying the scope of the BIA's
review: "The Board will not engage in de novo review of findings of fact determined by
an immigration judge. Facts determined by the immigration judge, including findings
as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to determine whether the find-
ings of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous."); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) per-
taining to BIA review of nonfactual decisions ("The Board may review questions of law,
discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of immigration
judges de novo.").
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cluded that those limits do not apply to his review because the recent
promulgation of C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) did not alter the previously articu-
lated de novo standard governing the Attorney General's review.71 The
Attorney General also cited INA § 103(a)(1) to assert "his authority to
make controlling determinations with respect to questions of law arising
under those statutes."'72 Thus the Attorney General asserted the power to
set aside the record developed below and to decide anew the legal and fac-
tual issues presented, regardless of whether the IJ or the BIA had erred.
2. Broad Discretion and Lack of Judicial Review
The Attorney General also asserted his broad discretion in determin-
ing whether an alien's release on bond is warranted. 73 He buttressed that
discretion by asserting the unreviewability of his decisions under INA
§ 236(e).74 That section 75 seems to preclude judicial review of the Attor-
ney General's decisions regarding detention or release of any alien. Never-
theless, the Attorney General acknowledged that his decision had to have a
"reasonable foundation." 76
71. See D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 575 (citing Deportation Proceedings of John Patrick
Thomas Doherty, 12 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (1988) for the proposition that the Attorney Gen-
eral "retains full authority to receive additional evidence and to make de novo factual
determinations" when reviewing a case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)).
72. See id. at 573-74, 574 n.2 (citing section 103(a)(1) of the I.N.A., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(1), as amended by Homeland Security Act of 2002 Amendments, Division L of
Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 105(a)(1), 117 Stat. 531 (2003)). Section 103(a)(1) provides:
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration
and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration
and naturalization of aliens, except insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to
the powers, functions, and duties conferred upon the President, Attorney Gen-
eral, the Secretary of State, the officers of the Department of State, or diplomatic
or consular offices: Provided, however, That determination and ruling by the
Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.
Id.
73. See id. at 575-76.
The law governing the detention or release of aliens such as respondent (i.e.,
aliens arrested and detained pending a decision on removal) is set forth in sec-
tion 236(a) of the INA. It provides that the Attorney General may (1) continue
to detain the alien; or (2) release the alien on bond or conditional parole ....
Further, the INA does not limit the discretionary factors that may be considered
by the Attorney General in determining whether to detain an alien pending a
decision on asylum or removal.
Id.
74. See id. at 575 (noting that "[tjhe extensive discretion granted the Attorney Gen-
eral under the statute is confirmed by its further provision that '[tihe Attorney General's
discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to
[judiciall review"' and citing I.N.A. § 236([e])).
75. I.N.A. § 236(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), reads in full:
The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this
section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or
decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or
release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.
Id.
76. See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 576 (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534
(1952), noting that the "Attorney General's denial of bail to alien is within his lawful
discretion as long as it has a 'reasonable foundation'"; United States ex rel. Barbour v.
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3. National Security Grounds
After establishing his broad discretion to determine release on bond,
the Attorney General concluded that "releasing respondent [David Joseph],
or similarly situated undocumented seagoing migrants, on bond would
give rise to adverse consequences for national security and sound immigra-
tion policy."77 The Attorney General noted that releasing aliens such as
David Joseph implicated national security interests because it would
encourage further unlawful mass migrations from Haiti, divert Coast
Guard and Department of Defense resources from counterterrorism and
homeland security responsibilities when they must deal with such migra-
tions, and fortify Haiti as a "staging point" for third country nationals such
as "Pakistanis, Palestinians, etc." to reach the United States. 78 Further, the
Attorney General ordered IJs and the BIA to consider national security
interests in all future bond proceedings of persons seeking to enter the
United States illegally. 79
4. Due Process Rights of Inadmissible Aliens
Finally, the Attorney General addressed David Joseph's constitutional
due process claim to an "individualized determination" rather than a blan-
ket denial of release for all similarly situated persons.80 He distinguished
David Joseph, an inadmissible undocumented alien, from lawful perma-
nent residents who do have a due process right to an individualized hear-
ing when subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c).8 1 He
further distinguished David Joseph from aliens, once admitted and later
ordered removed, who qualify for "limited due process protection."82 The
Attorney General explained that even if David Joseph were afforded an indi-
vidualized hearing, it would nonetheless be permissible for "general con-
siderations applicable to a category of migrants" to be considered.
83
Dist. Dir. of I.N.S., 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir. 1974), noting that the "INS finding that
alien was a threat to national security warranted denial of bond, applying 'reasonable
foundation' standard; and Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745, 748 (9th Cir.
1972), noting that the "Attorney General's exercise of discretionary authorities under
the INA must be upheld if they are founded 'on considerations rationally related to the
statute he is administering."').
77. Id. at 579.
78. Id. at 579-80.
79. Id. at 581 ("Further, in all future bond proceedings involving aliens seeking to
enter the United States illegally, where the Government offers evidence from sources in
the Executive Branch with relevant expertise establishing that significant national secur-
ity interests are implicated, IJs and the BIA shall consider such interests.").
80. Id. at 582.
81. See id. at 582-83 (referring to Demore v. Kim, 536 U.S. 956 (2002), which dealt
with the due process rights of lawful permanent residents).
82. See id. (distinguishing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001), which dealt
with the due process rights of aliens initially admitted and later ordered removed).
83. See id. at 583 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 313-14, 314 n.9 (1993), for
the proposition that "[t]he Attorney General is broadly authorized to detain respondent,
and deny his request for bond, based on any reasonable consideration, individualized or
general, that is consistent with the Attorney General's statutory responsibilities.").
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D. Application of International Law
At the end of his opinion, the Attorney General dismissed David
Joseph's argument that "an INS policy of detaining Haitian migrants in
order to deter other Haitians from migrating to the United States seeking
asylum violates international law."8 4 He concluded that David Joseph's
reliance on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 14 right to
asylum, coupled with an advisory opinion of the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees stating that "asylum seekers should not be
detained for the purposes of deterrence," were insufficient to merit release
on bond.8 5 He based his conclusion on the proposition that "the UDHR is
merely a nonbinding expression of aspirations and principles, rather than
a legally binding treaty."'8 6 He also stated that "the application of U.S. law
to protect the nation's borders against mass migrations by hundreds of
undocumented aliens violates no right protected by the UDHR or any other
applicable rule of international law."8 7 In support of this, he cited classic
plenary power cases.8 8
In reference to detention, the Attorney General asserted that the power
to detain aliens is incident to the power to expel them, stating that "[tihe
authority to expel aliens is meaningless without the authority to detain
those who pose a danger or a flight risk during the process of determining
whether they should be expelled."8 9 He concluded by noting that "[t]he
national security interests invoked in this opinion are directed at unlawful
and dangerous mass migrations by sea, not the right to seek asylum." 90
Finally, in a footnote, the Attorney General pointed out that federal immi-
gration laws-exclusively-afford asylum seekers all of the rights that they
are due. 9 1
84. Id. at 584.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 816 n.17 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
87. Id. at 584.
88. Id. (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977), which quotes Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953), "As the Supreme Court has
recognized, '[Tihe power to expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attri-
bute exercised by the Government's political departments .
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 584 n.8.
The Protocol [Relating to the Status of Refugees] is not self-executing, but Con-
gress has incorporated into the INA, through the Refugee Act of 1980, the appro-
priate requirements of the Protocol. Consequently, the Protocol does not afford
respondent any rights beyond what he is afforded under the federal immigration
laws, as applied in this decision. See Abdelwahed v. I.N.S., 22 Fed. Appx. 811,
815, 2001 WL 1480651 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that "the Protocol does not give
[the petitioner] any rights beyond what he already enjoys under the immigration
statutes"); Legal Obligations of the United States Under Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention, 15 Op. O.L.C. 86, 87 (1991) ("[T]he Protocol by which the United
States adhered to the Convention is not self-executing for domestic law pur-
poses. Accordingly, the Protocol itself does not create rights or duties that can
be enforced by a court.").
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III. Analysis
A. Application of U.S. Law
1. Foreclosing Judicial Review
a) Unchecked Administrative Power
"Even discretion ... has its legal limits." '92
The Attorney General's broad discretion combined with plenary
power's stifling effect on judicial review has left noncitizens prey to arbi-
trary government action in immigration matters.9 3 The blanket detention
without bond of noncriminal Haitian asylum seekers, with complete disre-
gard of individualized determinations, is an extreme example of abuse of
administrative power. I will demonstrate in the next sections that the
Attorney General's decision in D-J- extends well beyond the United States'
historic hostility toward Haitian asylum seekers and that this most recent
measure exceeds even the constitutional maxim that "Congress regularly
makes rules [for noncitizens] that would be unacceptable if applied to citi-
zens."94 In this section, I will demonstrate that D-J- is a dangerous aberra-
tion from the legitimate use of administrative power.
Congress has charged the Attorney General with the administration
and enforcement of U.S. immigration laws.95 As such, the Attorney Gen-
eral and immigration authorities under his supervision are part of the
administrative state. The statute giving life to administrative agencies also
enshrines judicial review to protect individuals from arbitrary and capri-
cious agency action.9 6 Although the Supreme Court has held that the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") does not apply to immigration pro-
ceedings, 9 7 Justice Sca]ia has asserted that "abuse of discretion" review
remains available "according to those standards of federal administration
embodied in what we have described as the "the 'common law' of judicial
review of agency action."98 According to Justice Scalia, if an abuse of dis-
cretion occurs, even in the immigration context, "courts are commanded
by the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to
'hold [it] unlawful and set [it] aside."' 99
Even in the immigration context, the Court has insisted on "the strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action." 100
92. I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 330 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. See Michael G. Heyman, Immigration Symposium: Judicial Review of Discretionary
Immigration Decisionmaking, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 861, 862 (1994).
94. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
95. I.N.A. § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103.
96. See § 706 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat.
237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
97. Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 133 (1991).
98. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 330 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
99. See id. (asserting that "[ailthough the detailed hearing procedures specified by
the APA do not apply to hearings under the Immigration and Nationality Act . .. the
judicial review provisions do" and citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955)).
100. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001); see also I.N.A. § 236(e), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(e) (attempting to overcome the presumption by stating that "[t]he Attorney Gen-
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Administrative law scholars have asserted that judicial review of agency
action is a necessary condition of a legitimate or legally valid system of
administrative power. 10 1 In response to congressional delegation of broad
powers to the executive branch, the extreme example of which is seen in
the immigration context, separation of powers considerations demand
external controls on agency action through judicial review.10 2
Based on these core principles of administrative law, reflected in the
Supreme Court's reluctance to hand over an individual's fate to the
unchecked power of government agencies, the Attorney General's assertion
of broad discretion to deny bond 10 3 should be subject to judicial review in
all cases. Because INA § 236(e) blatantly usurps a core judicial function of
reviewing the actions of an administrative agency where an individual's
fundamental rights are at stake, it should be deemed unconstitutional. The
call for judicial review of government action against noncitizens, however,
invariably runs up against the plenary power doctrine. The next section
will demonstrate that plenary power no longer justifies the unconstitu-
tional treatment of inadmissible noncitizens.
b) Plenary Power & Due Process Rights of Inadmissible Persons
After the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, striking
down the indefinite detention of deportable resident aliens, 10 4 Professor
Aleinikoff asked, "Is the plenary power doctrine dead?"10 5 Commentators
have asserted, on various grounds, that it should die, and recent Supreme
Court decisions reveal an eagerness to circumscribe it. The Court's strong
rebuke of the Executive's wartime excesses outside of the immigration con-
text coupled with the egregiously pretextual use of a national security justi-
fication in D-J- afford an opportunity for the long-awaited demise of the
doctrine.
Courts and commentators have advanced many valid reasons for put-
ting an end to the plenary power doctrine. In stark contrast with the
express provision protecting all "persons" under the Fifth Amendment;
10 6
eral's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be sub-
ject to review").
101. Louis JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965).
102. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 487 (1989).
103. See In re D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 572, 575-76 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
[INA § 236(a)] merely gives the Attorney General the authority to grant bond if
he concludes, in the exercise of broad discretion, that the alien's release on bond
is warranted .... Even apart from [INA § 236(e)], the courts have consistently
recognized that the Attorney General has extremely broad discretion in deter-
mining whether or not to release an alien on bond under this and like
provisions.
Id.
104. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
105. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 365 (2002).
106. The Fifth Amendment is express: It mandates that "no person" shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Further-
more, the Court has affirmed the universal application of the Fifth Amendment to all
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there is no support for "plenary power" in the text of the Constitution. 10 7
The Court has sought to limit the doctrine from its earliest days' 0 8 and
reserved for itself "a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution"
over Congress's immigration power. 10 9 Furthermore, the doctrine leaves
the door open to unthinkable government abuses, such as torture or sum-
mary execution of inadmissible persons, 110 and it is fully out of line with
persons within the territory of the United States. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976):
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The Fifth Amendment... protects every one of these persons from deprivation
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one whose pres-
ence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that
constitutional protection.
Id. Justice Field recognized this over a hundred years ago: "The term 'person,' used in
the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough to include any and every human being within the
jurisdiction of the republic." Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242 (1896)
(Field, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
107. The Constitution contains no provision giving Congress the power to control
immigration, much less plenary power. See Louis Henkin, Essays Commemorating the
One Hundredth Anniversary of the Harvard Law Review: The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HALv. L. REv. 853, 858
(1987):
That Congress has a power to control immigration, a power not rooted in any
provision of the Constitution, is no more radical a jurisprudential innovation
than are some others we have assimilated during our constitutional history.
However, the accretions to that doctrine-notably the notion that immigration
controls are not subject to the constitutional limitations applicable to congres-
sional acts generally-cry out for the sharpest criticism.
Id.
108. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that
administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the
liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due
process of law' . . . . One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived
of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard ......
Id. See Trevor Morrison, Note, Removed from the Constitution? Deportable Aliens' Access
to Habeas Corpus Under the New Immigration Legislation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
697, 717-18 (1997).:
According to the Yamataya Court, the plenary power doctrine is not a doctrine
of absolute power, nor is it a means of circumventing the Constitution. Rather,
it is a doctrine under which the political branches exercise broad authority, sub-
ject to the provisions of the Constitution .... The Constitution limits expres-
sions of the plenary power, and the judiciary is empowered to enforce such
limitation. That the judiciary has consistently failed to impose rigorous review
on the immigration-related activities of the political branches does not make
constitutional the statutory withdrawal of such review.
Id.
109. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977) ("Our cases reflect acceptance of a
limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of
Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens ....").
110. Courts have warned of the dangers of permitting the government unbridled
power over inadmissible noncitizens. See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410
(6th Cir. 2003) (en banc):
The fact that excludable aliens are entitled to less process, however, does not
mean that they are not at all protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. If excludable aliens were not protected by even
the substantive component of constitutional due process, as the government
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modern understandings of the Constitution." 1 1 Aforementioned criticisms
notwithstanding, the AG's decision in D-J- avowed his belief in the continu-
ing vitality of the plenary power doctrine, to the extent that he assumed
away any constitutional right that David Joseph, as an inadmissible alien,
may have claimed. 1 1
2
In Zadvydas,1 13 the Court pointed out that Congress's plenary power
to create immigration law "is subject to important constitutional limita-
tions."' 1 4 At the same time, however, the Court seemed to reaffirm the so-
called "entry fiction," noting that "[tlhe distinction between an alien who
has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered
runs throughout immigration law."115 The Court also made clear that its
decision, dealing with the indefinite detention of once lawfully admitted
noncitizens, did not implicate "the political branches' authority to control
entry into the United States" nor "terrorism or other special circumstances
where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention
and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches
appears to argue, we do not see why the United States government could not
torture or summarily execute them. Because we do not believe that our Consti-
tution could permit persons living in the United States-whether they can be
admitted for permanent residence or not-to be subjected to any government
action without limit, we conclude that government treatment of excludable
aliens must implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.; see also Xi v. U.S. I.N.S., 298 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
Zadvydas holding that indefinite detention of once admitted aliens is unconstitutional
also applies to inadmissible aliens who have not yet been admitted to the United States);
Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 873-74 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting):
Our case law makes clear that excludable aliens do, in fact, enjoy Fifth Amend-
ment protections.
... [Elven in the immigration context, the principle that unadmitted aliens have
no constitutionally protected rights defies rationality. Under this view, the
Attorney General, for example, could invoke legitimate immigration goals to jus-
tify a decision to stop feeding all detained aliens.
id.
111. See Aleinikoff, supra note 105, at 374 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953), which notes that the infamous phrase "'whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry
is concerned' . . . is wildly out of step with modern constitutional law."); see also Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substan-
tive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1626 (1992) ("The stunted growth of
constitutional immigration law contrasts sharply with the flowering of constitutional
protections for aliens in areas other than immigration law.").
112. See In re D-J, 23 1. & N. Dec. 572, 583 (Att'y Gen. 2003) (quoting Zhengv. I.N.S.,
207 F. Supp. 2d 550, 552 (E.D. La. 2002) as holding that "[tihe detention of aliens who
have been denied initial admission into the United States does not implicate the Fifth
Amendment, even if such aliens were subsequently paroled or released within the coun-
try."). David Joseph, charged as inadmissible, would be "legally considered to be
detained at the border and hence as never having effected entry into this country." Id.
Inadmissible aliens are distinguishable from lawful permanent residents who have been
held to have due process rights entitling them to protections such as an individualized
bond hearing. Id. at 582 (citing Demore v. Kim, 536 US. 956 (2002)).
113. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
114. Id. at 695.
115. Id. at 693.
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with respect to matters of national security."1 16 For these reasons, Profes-
sor Aleinikoff unhappily concluded that Zadvydas, although a victory for
fundamental justice, did not portend the death of the plenary power
doctrine. 11
7
There have been important developments following the Court's deci-
sion in Zadvydas and Professor Aleinikoffs commentary that would seem
to favor, if not the death, at least a diminution of the plenary power doc-
trine as applied to David Joseph and similarly situated persons.1 18 First,
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have read the restraint imposed on plenary
power in Zadvydas to extend to inadmissible persons as well.1 19 Second,
the Supreme Court signaled, in a recent series of cases dealing with the
detention of so-called "enemy combatants," that it would not tolerate
unbridled executive power even in wartime, even over noncitizens not
within the territory of the United States. 120
116. Id. at 695-96.
117. See Aleinikoff, supra note 105, at 375:
The reaffirmation of the border/interior distinction as a constitutional matter in
Zadvydas represents a particularly unhappy result. Not only is it hard to square
with logic or the statutory structure, it also places in constitutional no-man's
land literally tens of millions of persons who face state power at U.S. borders
each year.
Id. Aleinikoff further found that:
Zadvydas, for all its Warren Court-like rulemaking, takes no steps toward ensur-
ing what is most needed in the immigration detention system: meaningful judi-
cial review of ordinary detention decisions. Finally, given the terrible events of
the day, the courts are not likely to restrict the attempts by the other branches to
exploit the escape clauses in the opinion for [terrorism and national secur-
ity] .... Zadvydas will probably come to look a lot like Plyler v. Doe: a case that
stands for fundamental justice more than constitutional logic-one that is
unlikely to be overturned but also unlikely to chart a major change in constitu-
tional law.
Id. at 366-67.
118. It should be noted that Zadvydas dealt with indefinite detention. As of August
2004, David Joseph has been in federal custody in Miami for almost two years. Bob
Herbert, Ashcroft's Quiet Prisoner, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at 21. Although his term
of detention well surpasses the 6-month presumption of "reasonable detention" that the
Court laid down in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701, the arguments in this Note against David
Joseph's detention without bond do not turn on the length of his detention. As such, it
is a harder argument to make than the indefinite detention cases, but nonetheless what
this Note seeks to accomplish.
119. Guo XI v. I.N.S., 298 F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 2002); Rosales-Garcia v. Holland,
322 F.3d 386, 405-06 (6th Cir. 2003). But see Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1007
(8th Cir. 2003); Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003); Rios v. I.N.S.,
324 F.3d 296, 297 (5th Cir. 2003); Hoyte-Mesa v. Ashcroft, 272 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 846 (2002); Sierra v. Romaine, 347 F.3d 559, 576 (3d. Cir.
2003).
120. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (concerning a writ of
habeas corpus filed by an American citizen captured in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
and removed to a prison ship off the coast of South Carolina); Rasul v. Bush. 124 S.Ct.
2686, 2698-99 (1903) (involving a challenge by captured Kuwaiti and Australian citi-
zens, who were allegedly fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan, to the legality of their
detentions on Guantanamo).
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In Hamdi v. Rumsfield, the Court issued a strong rebuke to executive
excesses while affirming the fundamental role of the courts in protecting
individual liberty, especially in wartime:
We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with these sensitive matters
will pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise
in an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding
essential liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns. 12 1
Finally, given the recent erosion of plenary power and admonition
against abuse of executive power during wartime, D-J- presents a compel-
ling case for sounding the death knell for plenary power. The historic ani-
mosity of the U.S. government towards Haitian asylum seekers makes plain
that the Attorney General's use of a national security justification and war
on terrorism rhetoric in D-J- is a pretext for dealing harshly, once again,
with a despised immigrant group. 1 22 What is really behind David Joseph's
detention is the government's desire to send a message, once and for all, to
Haitian asylum seekers that they are not welcome in the United States. 1 23
After interdiction on the high seas and incommunicado imprisonment on
Guantanamo Bay, the Attorney General's blanket detention of Haitian asy-
lum seekers who do manage to reach U.S. shores is a last-ditch effort to
deter their attempts to seek refuge in the United States. The Attorney Gen-
eral himself expressly stated that the essential purpose of detaining David
Joseph is to deter other Haitians from coming:
ITihe release of respondent [David Joseph] and hundreds of others from the
October 29 migrant group would strongly undercut any resultant deterrent
effect arising from the [expedited removal] policy. The persistent history of
mass migration from Haiti, in the face of concerted statutory and regulatory
measures to curtail it, confirms that even sporadic successful entries fuel
further attempts. 12 4
Of course, the Attorney General's deterrence rationale is grounded in
a fundamental concept of the penal system-to inflict punishment, here
imprisonment-on some in order to deter others. Not coincidentally,
detention centers for immigration law violators are the same as prisons
housing criminal offenders. 125 A key difference is that convicted
criminals, including criminal aliens, enjoy a host of constitutional protec-
tions before being deprived of their liberty.1 2 6 With his decision in D-J-,
121. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2652.
122. See supra Part I.C.
123. See Young, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children Presentation,
supra note 7.
124. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 580 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
125. See United States: Locked Away: Immigration Detainees in Jails in the United States,
Vol. 10, No. 1(G), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports98/us-immig (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
126. Christoper R. Yukins, Note, The Measure of a Nation: Granting Excludable Aliens
Fundamental Protections of Due Process, 73 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1507 (1987) (explaining
that "aliens are 'persons' within the [Flifth and [S]ixth [A]mendments, and cannot there-
fore be denied their liberty, or convicted of a serious crime, without due process of
law.").
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the Attorney General hopes to send a message to would-be Haitian asylum
seekers: if you try to come here, we will not look at your individualized
circumstances; rather we will punish all of you with imprisonment. The
government, however, may not use its immigration power, including deten-
tion to effect removal, for punitive purposes. 127
In an early case outlining the contours of plenary power, the Court,
characteristic of the day, affirmed the racist application of Congress's
immigration power, 12 8 but stopped short of permitting Congress to punish
persons unlawfully present: "[T]o declare unlawful residence within the
country to be an infamous crime, punishable by deprivation of liberty and
property, would be to pass out of the sphere of constitutional legisla-
tion .... -129 While Congress has not gone so far as to expressly legislate
the detention of all Haitians illegally present in the United States, the deci-
sion in D-J, subjecting individuals like David Joseph to "generalized" con-
siderations equally applicable to all arriving Haitians, is effectively a per se
rule that reaches the same result. If the Court would strike down congres-
sional legislation mandating the imprisonment of all arriving Haitians, it
must not allow the Attorney General to reach the same end through
enforcement of the law.
Thus, the Court should see through the Attorney General's "national
security" justification as a pretext for punishing Haitian asylum seekers,
and, accordingly, afford constitutional protection to David Joseph. If the
Court undermines the plenary power doctrine by recognizing David
Joseph as a "person" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, then the judicial review-stripping device of INA § 236(e)
should be found unconstitutional since it seeks to deprive the courts of
jurisdiction to hear challenges to detentions that implicate Fifth Amend-
127. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 694 (2001) ("The Court held that punitive
measures could not be imposed upon aliens ordered removed because 'all persons
within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection' of the Constitu-
tion.") (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)). See David Cole,
In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY LJ. 1003,
1007 (2002):
[D]ue process places significant constraints on the government's power to
detain individuals pursuant to immigration authority. Because the immigration
power cannot be used punitively, the government may not take a noncitizen's
liberty without an individualized showing that the person poses either a danger
to the community or a risk of flight.
Id; see also Yukins, supra note 126, at 1507 ("[I]f the detention of an excludable alien is
intended as punishment, rather than as a necessary part of the exclusion process, it will
be held unconstitutional.").
128. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896):
No limits can be put by the courts upon the power of Congress to protect, by
summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits
render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel such if they have already found
their way into our land and unlawfully remain therein.
Id. Wong Wing was decided in 1896, the same year as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
129. Id.
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ment rights. 130 Even if INA § 236(e) stands, however, David Joseph still
has the opportunity for the Court to review a challenge to his detention
through habeas corpus. The next section demonstrates that his right to
habeas review is still available in spite of INA § 236(e), but argues that
habeas by itself is insufficient to ensure a regularized system of judicial
review of discretionary detention decisions.
c) Availability of Habeas Relief
Habeas corpus relief is available in spite of the language of INA
§ 236(e) barring judicial review of the Attorney General's discretionary
judgment. A nonresident alien qualifies as a "person" who may seek
habeas relief to challenge his detention.' 3 1 Section 236(e) of the INA
reads:
The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of
this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action
or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the deten-
tion or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or
parole. 132
Because the preclusion of judicial review of the Attorney General's dis-
cretionary decisions appears in absolute terms, there has been concern
that the language covering decisions by the Attorney General "regarding
the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of
bond or parole"'133 implicates preclusion of habeas corpus relief as well. 134
However, in its recent decision, Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court held
that to bar habeas corpus relief, Congress must evince a clear statement of
its intent to do so. 135 Thus, contrary to the Attorney General's insistence
in D-J- that his decision whether to release an alien on bond is effectively
unreviewable due to his grant of "extremely broad discretion,"'13 6 Demore
supports the proposition that federal courts retain jurisdiction to grant
habeas relief to inadmissible persons such as David Joseph in spite of the
language contained in INA § 236(e). 13 7
130. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 383 (3d. ed. 1988) (noting that if Congress "clos[ed] the doors of the
federal courts in federal question cases to plaintiffs who were black, or Jewish, the provi-
sion would surely violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment");
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Response, Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1068, 1089-90 (1998) (noting that even if Congress confers a particular
power "in terms that appear in isolation to be unqualified, that power may still be sub-
ject to restraints arising from other provisions of the Constitution").
131. See 1-8 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8.2[a] n.7 (1994).
132. I.N.A. § 236(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
133. Id.
134. See Ira J. Kurzban, The Disappearing Federal Courts, THE CHAMPION (1997) ("In
short, Congress has sought to eliminate completely the writ of habeas corpus in immi-
gration proceedings."), at http://www.criminaljustice.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/
97aug05.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
135. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
136. See In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 575-76 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
137. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 517.
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Although retention of habeas review of immigration-related detentions
is important, it is an extraordinary remedy that is insufficient to meet the
system-wide demands of detained persons. Lack of a standard avenue for
judicial review puts greater procedural burdens on noncitizens because few
immigration attorneys are familiar with filing for habeas-even if the
detained noncitizen is fortunate enough to have an attorney in the first
place-and, more importantly, because habeas requires that the depriva-
tion of liberty take place before the court may review the government's
action. 138 The effect, therefore, of precluding judicial review is not merely
procedural. Rather, the noncitizen must necessarily suffer a loss of his
substantive right to liberty before the court may have an opportunity to
review. 139
2. Decided Wrongly on the Merits
The previous sections dealt with the attempts of Congress and the
Attorney General to cut off David Joseph from judicial review of his bond
decision. This section addresses the Attorney General's decision on the
merits. It concludes that denial of bond to David Joseph and "similarly
situated persons," with no regard to individualized considerations, consti-
tutes an unreasonable and unjustifiable blanket detention. Furthermore,
the larger statutory framework at issue in D-J- illustrates that Congress did
not intend to make Haitians-in contrast to "terrorists"-dangerous as a
matter of law, as the D-J- decision accomplishes.
a) Lacks a Reasonable Foundation
First, it is important to ascertain the substantive due process interest
at stake in D-J-. Government detention of an individual that is based on
generalized national security concerns and that denies the individual the
opportunity for a predetention hearing infringes a noncitizen's "liberty
interest."140 This liberty interest encompasses a person's right to be free
from undue restraints on movement imposed by the government. While
we might view government detention as less severe than, torture, for exam-
ple, it is important to note that detention for immigration purposes and
imprisonment are both forms of government custody that deprive persons
of their liberty.141
In D-J-, the Attorney General asserted that the discretionary factors he
may consider in determining whether to detain an alien are not limited by
138. Henry E. Velte, Ill, Mansour v. I.N.S.: Sixth Circuit Holds Judicial Review of Final
Orders of Deportation Against Certain Criminal Aliens Available Solely Through Habeas
Corpus Proceedings, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 671, 686 (1998).
139. See id.
140. See Hall v. I.N.S., 253 F. Supp. 2d 244, 257 (D.R.I. 2003).
141. See FEDERAL HABEAS COR'US PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 131, § 42.2(a):
In more recent years, as the Supreme Court and lower courts have broadened the
definition of "custody" in the federal and state prisoner context-expanding it to
include anyone "subject to restraints 'not shared by the public generally"-the
federal courts generally have broadened the concept as it applies to the immigra-
tion context as well.
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the INA.1 42 He would typically consider "the probability of the alien being
found deportable, the seriousness of the charge against him, if proved, the
danger to the public safety of his presence within the community, and the
alien's availability for subsequent proceedings if enlarged on bail."1 4 3 But
in determining that David Joseph should remain incarcerated, the Attorney
General was unguided by these usual considerations. Instead, the Attorney
General relied on certain generalized scenarios offered by the government
that could implicate a national security interest.14 4 Principally, he hoped
to conserve the terror-fighting resources of the U.S. Coast Guard by detain-
ing arriving Haitians to deter their future entry attempts as well as the
attempts of Pakistani, Palestinian, and other third country nationals seek-
ing to enter the United States by way of Haiti. The Attorney General's prof-
fered justifications for why Haitian asylum seekers must be detained
without bond on national security grounds were, however, wholly unre-
lated to the individual characteristics of David Joseph.14 5
The Attorney General did acknowledge, however, that his decision to
deny bail must meet the "reasonable foundation" standard articulated in
Carlson v. Landon.146 In Carlson, noncitizen members of the Communist
Party were arrested under the Internal Security Act of 1950 and held with-
out bond pending determination of deportability. 147 In habeas corpus
proceedings, the petitioners alleged that the Act's mandating their deten-
tion was unconstitutional and that denial of bail was an abuse of discre-
tion. 148 The Supreme Court held that discretion in granting or denying
bail could be overridden when it was clear that the discretionary decision
lacked a reasonable foundation. 149 In the Carlson case, where petitioners
actively engaged in Communist work, the Court found the discretionary
Id.
142. In re D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 572, 576 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
143. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 539 n.33 (1952).
144. See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 579-80. The Attorney General noted that the release
of aliens such as David Joseph implicated national security interests because it would
encourage further unlawful mass migrations from Haiti, divert Coast Guard and Depart-
ment of Defense resources from counterterrorism and homeland security responsibili-
ties when they must deal with such migrations, and fortify Haiti as a "staging point" for
Pakistani, Palestinian, and other third country nationals to reach the United States. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 576 (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952)). Cf. Jeanty v.
Bulger, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2002), affid sub nom. Moise v. Bulger, 321
F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8367 (2003) (using a "facially
legitimate and bona fide reason" standard).
The case law establishes that the Court's scope of review is limited to determin-
ing whether the Government has advanced a "facially legitimate and bona fide
reason" for its parole policies and decisions. Applying this extremely deferential
standard, the Court next finds that saving lives, deterring mass migration, and
ensuring the presence of inadmissible aliens at their immigration hearings are
facially legitimate and bona fide reasons supporting the policy of granting
parole to Haitians only in cases of unique hardship.
Id.
147. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 528-529 (1952).
148. Id. at 529-32.
149. Id. at 539 n.33.
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denial of bail was justifiable as being in the public interest. 150
Although a self-imposed "reasonableness" limitation, with no external
review, would seem to constitute no check at all on the Attorney General's
power, the "reasonable foundation" standard articulated in Carlson and
applied in D-J- provides a basis for the Court to review the Attorney Gen-
eral's exercise of discretion to deny bond.
The Attorney General relied on Carlson to support his "extensive dis-
cretion" to make bond determinations. 151 However, Carlson was implicitly
grounded on the Court's belief that the Attorney General would use his
discretionary power to refuse to grant bond only against noncitizens who
would "hurt the United States during the pendency of deportation pro-
ceedings."' 5 2 The Court expressly stated that "[o]f course purpose to
injure could not be imputed generally to all aliens subject to deportation,
so discretion [to detain without bail] was placed . . . in the Attorney
General .... -153
If Carlson's "reasonable foundation review" were employed to evaluate
the Attorney General's detention without bond of Haitian asylum seekers,
his decision would not stand. While detaining terrorists and suspected
terrorists arguably has a "reasonable foundation" based on "national secur-
ity grounds," stretching "national security interests" to encompass deten-
tion of Haitian asylum seekers lacks such a "reasonable foundation." The
Attorney General asserted that the national security interests implicated by
granting bond in D-J- were encouragement of further unlawful migrations
from Haiti that divert Coast Guard and Department of Defense resources
from counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities and fortifi-
cation of Haiti as a launch pad to the United States for third country
nationals such as "Pakistanis, Palestinians, etc."154 However, according to
the U.S. Coast Guard's website, on an "average day," the Coast Guard will
"assist 136 people in distress .... conduct 106 search and rescue cases....
[and] teach boating safety courses to 289 boaters."'51 5 In stark contrast to
these numbers, the Coast Guard will interdict only "15 illegal migrants at
sea" on the "average day.' 156 Based on this reasoning, the Attorney Gen-
eral could detain noncitizen beach-goers who divert the resources of the
Coast Guard when they are attacked by sharks.1 57 Similarly, noncitizens
150. Id. at 541.
151. See D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 572, 575-576 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
152. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 538.
153. Id.
154. See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 579-80.
155. See U.S. Coast Guard Statistics, Average Day, at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/
comrel/factfile/factcards/AvgDay.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
156. See id.
157. See Press Release, United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Airlifts Shark Attack
Victim (Aug. 17, 2002), http://www.uscg.mil/d8/dpa/117-02.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
2004); Press Release, United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Medevacs Swimmer from
Johnston Atoll (June 23, 2003), http://www.uscg.mil/d14/news%5Frelease/2003/
june2003.htm#21-03 (last visited Nov. 22, 2004); Philip Delves Broughton, Hysteria as
Sharks Mass off Florida, THE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 16, 2001, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/08/16/wbitel6.xml.
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who are poor swimmers, leisure boaters, and fishermen l58 could be sub-
ject to detention for the drain they impose on Coast Guard resources.
It is unprecedented to extend the class of presumptively harmful
aliens, such as convicted criminals, suspected terrorists, and (former)
Communists, to a group of persons whose only purported harmfulness
appears to be diversion of Coast Guard resources and supposed accessibil-
ity as a launch pad to the United States for third country nationals. The
government provided no statistics on the number of third country nation-
als entering the United States via overcrowded sea-going vessels from Haiti.
In fact, in response the Attorney General's invocation of a "State Depart-
ment declaration" to support his assertion that "Pakistanis, Palestinians,
etc." are "using Haiti as a staging point for attempted migration to the
United States,"159 a State Department spokeman stated, "We all are
scratching our heads, [wie are asking each other, 'Where did they get
that?" 160 Further, even if the government could find some support for its
otherwise baseless "third country national" claim, an individualized bond
determination would facilitate the government's ability to pick out third
country nationals from the majority of Haitian asylum seekers arriving
with them.
Further, any country, including the United States's closest allies, can
serve as a conduit for third country nationals to reach the United States.
For example, many of the September 11th hijackers entered the United
States after extended stays in European countries such as Germany. 16 1 If
the Attorney General's decision in D-J- were held to have a "reasonable
foundation," the national security net could be cast to detain inadmissible
aliens from any and all countries. Although ordering detention of Haitian
asylum seekers rather than nationals of all countries might make the Attor-
ney General's decision underinclusive, though not necessarily unconstitu-
tional per se, the Court should assert review to check an abuse of the
discretion to deny bail that perniciously singles out Haitian asylum seekers
because of some invented association between them and "Pakistanis, Pales-
tinians, etc."-a move that in itself presents a problematic "deployment of
the Muslim-terrorist equation." 162
158. See generally U.S. Coast Guard Headlines Archive (listing press releases showing
Coast Guard actions to rescue poor swimmers, leisure boaters, and fishermen), http://
www.uscg.mil/news/archives.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
159. In re D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 572, 579 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
160. Jacqueline Charles, Diplomats Puzzled by Claim Migrants Use Haiti To Enter U.S.,
MihMi HERALD, HERALD.COM, Apr.25, 2003, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/
miamiherald/5711187.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp&lc.
161. Jonathan Fighel, International Terrorism in Germany: An Ongoing Threat, May 1,
2002, at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=437 (last visited Nov. 22,
2004).
162. See Muneer 1. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as
Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1281 (2004):
Mere mention of "Pakistanis, Palestinians, etc." [in D-J-] ... is sufficient to estab-
lish a terrorist concern regarding the flow of refugees from Haiti with almost no
further analysis or facts .... Pakistanis and Palestinians represent some larger
class of people, as evident by the "etc." which follows .... It seems quite clear
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Subjecting the Attorney General's decision to Carlson's "reasonable
foundation" review would require the government to show that David
Joseph himself would "hurt the United States during the pendency of
[removal] proceedings." 163 This would require an individualized assess-
ment that pokes a hole in the AG's blanket determination, based on genera-
lized considerations, equally applicable to all arriving Haitian asylum
seekers.
b) Contrary to Statutory Construction
in Carlson, unlike in D-J-, the alien seeking bond, a Communist, was
part of a class of aliens statutorily defined as excludable based on security
concerns. 164 The Carlson Court held that in light of the Internal Security
Act, whose "purpose [was] to deport all alien Communists as a menace to
the security of the United States,"'165 it was within the Attorney General's
discretion to detain without bail aliens "active in Communist work."1 66 In
so holding, the Court relied upon Congress's assessment of Communist
aliens as a threat to security. The Attorney General's discretionary deci-
sion to deny bail to Communist aliens was plainly supported by Congress's
express assessment of the danger posed by such persons. The Carlson
Court's reasoning that detention without bail was meant only for aliens
who would "hurt the United States during the pendency of deportation
proceedings"'16 7 was compatible with Congress's assessment of the threat
posed by Communist aliens-thus, the Court was able to find the detention
of such persons within the lawful exercise of the Attorney General's
discretion.
In D-J-, the Attorney General did precisely what the Carlson Court
counseled against: He imputed a "purpose to injure"'16 8 on Haitian asylum
seekers generally, and he used it to justify their detention without bond.
While Congress and the immigration authorities have made extensive
efforts to keep Haitians from entering the United States illegally, 16 9 Con-
gress has not statutorily defined Haitians as a threat to national security as
it had Communists in the Carlson era and terrorists today. 170 In fact, con-
gressional will seems very much to the contrary. Senator Arlen Specter of
the Senate Judiciary Committee urged Attorney General Ashcroft to con-
sider cases like David Joseph's on a "more individual" basis, to determine
that it is not intended to include Irish, Italian, or Guatemalan citizens, just as it
seems clear that it is intended to include Syrian, Indonesian, and Saudi citi-
zens .... Thus, in the government's usage, Pakistanis and Palestinians do not
represent third country nationals, but third country Muslims ....
Id.
163. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 528 (1952).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 541.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 538.
168. See id.
169. See supra note 7.
170. See supra note 22.
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whether any real concerns about terrorism exist. 1 7 1 In response to Senator
Specter's questioning, the Attorney General stated: "Sometimes individual
treatment is important. Sometimes it's important to make a statement
about groups of people that come."'1 72 It is the job of Congress, however,
not the Attorney General, to make such "statements" about immigrant
groups. Of course, Congress accomplishes this through duly enacted legis-
lation that is subject to judicial review. Even if Congress did define Hai-
tians or any other nationality, ethnic or racial group as presumptively
dangerous and therefore subject to detention based solely upon member-
ship in the group, the Court would likely strike down such a discrimina-
tory classification. 17 3
Certainly since September 1 lth, Congress was concerned about giving
immigration authorities a way of deterring aliens who might present a
threat to "national security." Congress dealt with its concerns about ter-
rorists and suspected terrorists in INA Sections §§ 236A17 4 and
212(a)(3)(b). 175 The fact that Congress has already statutorily defined a
class of persons it deems dangerous makes the Attorney General's assess-
ment of the danger posed by Haitian asylum seekers seem still more
pretextual.
In D-J-, the Attorney General imported these specific national security-
premised themes into his discretionary decisions under INA § 236(a).
However, if Congress wanted "national security" to be one of the factors
taken into account to determine release on bond under INA § 236(a), Con-
gress could have stated it. Of course, immigration officials may always
look to the "Security and related grounds" enunciated in INA § 212(a)(3)
to determine whether an individual alien poses a threat. Similarly, aliens
who may threaten national security, e.g., suspected terrorists, are dealt
with in INA § 236A. The importation of the "national security" justifica-
tion to preclude release on bond for Haitian asylum seekers would imply
that Congress duplicated efforts in enacting INA § 236(a) when INA
§ 212(a)(3) and INA § 236A were clearly sufficient to deal with threats to
security posed by aliens.
B. Application of International Law
The Attorney General's opinion summarily dismissed the proposition
that the United States has obligations to asylum seekers under interna-
tional law that would restrain the Attorney General's power to detain
171. Herbert, supra note 118.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding unconstitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment discrimination against Chinese aliens in the
operation of San Francisco laundry businesses where "no reason for [the discrimina-
tion] exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong,
and which in the eye of the law is not justified").
174. I.N.A. § 236A, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), pertains to "[m]andatory detention of sus-
pected terrorists; habeas corpus; judicial review."
175. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(3)(B), deals with exclusion of aliens for
terrorist activities.
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them. 176 He asserted that U.S. law trumps any rights of asylum seekers
that are derived from international law, stating that "[i]n any event, the
application of U.S. law to protect the nation's borders against mass migra-
tions by hundreds of undocumented aliens violates no right protected by
the UDHR or any other applicable rule of international law."177 However,
the language in which he refers to asylum seekers like David Joseph as
"undocumented aliens" followed immediately by his reliance on traditional
plenary power cases 178 suggests that the Attorney General has ignored the
distinction that international law draws between "undocumented aliens"
and asylum seekers. Although the Attorney General pointed out that David
Joseph's asylum claim remained pending on appeal, 179 throughout his
opinion, he refers to David Joseph and similarly situated Haitian asylum
seekers as "undocumented migrants" or "undocumented aliens."
Nonetheless, the Attorney General's characterization of the asylum
seekers as undocumented or illegal entrants to the United States does not
divest them of the protections duly afforded to them as asylum seekers
under both U.S. and international law. Nor do doubts on the part of the
Attorney General that David Joseph's asylum claim will be successful on
the merits180 provide a basis for classifying asylum seekers as "undocu-
mented migrants." Because the Attorney General purposefully conflated
the status of asylum seekers with that of undocumented migrants, he was
able to cursorily evaluate and dismiss David Joseph's international law
arguments. 181 However, had the Attorney General properly characterized
David Joseph as an asylum seeker, he would have had to overcome the pro-
tections afforded asylum seekers under international law.
The Attorney General's assertion that federal immigration law pro-
vides the sole basis for ascertaining the rights of asylum seekers in the
United States 182 ignores the fact that the United States is party to the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which incorporates the core
176. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 584 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
177. Id.
178. Id. ("As the Supreme Court has recognized, 'The power to expel or exclude aliens
[is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political depart-
ments .... .' (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953))).
179. Id. at 582 ("I note that the respondent was denied asylum by the Immigration
Judge on February 12, 2003. The respondent appealed that decision to the BIA on
March 14, 2003, and that appeal remains pending.").
180. Id. The Attorney General stated:
The J's denial of the respondent's application for asylum increases the risk that
the respondent will flee if released from detention. A respondent with a greater
likelihood of being granted relief from deportation has a greater motivation to
appear for a deportation hearing than one who, based on a criminal record or
otherwise, has less potential of being granted such relief.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
181. Cf. James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law
Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HAxv.
HuM. RTs. J. 115, 159 (1997) (noting that "a government could avoid all obligations
under the Refugee Convention by the simple expedient of refusing to consider whether
or not a person satisfied the refugee definition").
182. See D-J-+, 23 1. & N. Dec. 572, 585 n.8.
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articles of the Refugee Convention.18 3 As a party to the Protocol, under the
Vienna Convention, the United States has a good faith obligation to per-
form to the specifications of the Convention, and it may not invoke its
domestic immigration laws as an excuse for failing to perform its obliga-
tions to asylum seekers.18 4 Additionally, the acts of Congress authorizing
the Attorney General's broad and unreviewable discretion to detain asylum
seekers based on generalized national security interests may be a construc-
tion that violates international law concerning human rights and freedom
from detention.185
The Attorney General's decision to treat asylum seekers the same as
other undocumented aliens ignores the distinct situation of arriving asy-
lum seekers who may be forced by circumstances to enter a country ille-
gally in their efforts to escape persecution in their home countries.'
8 6
Article 31 of the Convention forbids the United States from imposing pen-
alties on asylum seekers on account of their illegal entry or presence pro-
vided that they present themselves to the authorities without delay and
show good cause for their illegal presence or entry. 187 It is unclear from
the facts of D-J- whether or not David Joseph was among the persons trying
to evade capture by the Coast Guard when their vessel landed in Florida.18 8
It is difficult, though, to assert that David Joseph waived his right under the
Convention to be free from penalties by not presenting himself to the
authorities without delay because he was immediately apprehended by the
authorities upon his arrival. Article 31 further provides that the United
States shall not restrict the movements of asylum seekers beyond what is
"necessary."1 8 9
Article 9 (Provisional Measures) of the Refugee Convention provides:
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war
or other grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally
measures which it considers to be essential to the national security in the
case of a particular person, pending a determination by the Contracting
State that that person is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such
measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national security. a9 °
Although Article 9 clearly allows a state to derogate from the Convention in
the interests of national security, the language "in the case of a particular
person" clearly means that a national security justification must be applied
by an individualized determination rather than by a blanket approach, as
used by the Attorney General in D-J-. Additionally, failure to adequately
analyze an asylum seeker's individual circumstances and an absence of
183. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 44.
184. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
186. See The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 43, 189 U.N.T.S. at art. 32(1).
187. See id. at art. 31(1).
188. See In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 576-77 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
189. See The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 43, 189 U.N.TS. at art. 31(2).
190. Id. at art. 9.
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judicial review of a detention determination constitutes an arbitrary
detention. 191
Conclusion
Judicial review provides a safety valve for the protection of individuals
and imposes a check on abuse of government power. The Attorney Gen-
eral's decision in D-J- represents an unreasonable abuse of discretion that
should be checked by the judiciary in all cases. Statutory withholding of
judicial review under INA § 236(e), in combination with de novo determi-
nation of both fact and law by the Attorney General, lays the foundation for
unchecked power. In D-J, the Attorney General abused his power by
ignoring individual circumstances in favor of generalized "national secur-
ity" considerations that were really a pretext for imposing punishment on
an undesirable immigrant group. Whether Congress changes INA § 236(e)
or the Court strikes it down as unconstitutional, there must be regular judi-
cial review of immigration-related detentions. Reference to protections
afforded to asylum seekers under international and U.S. law further
demand a check on the Attorney General's power to order such detentions.
191. See Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, supra note 54, 'l 14, 25.
